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INTRODUCTION
During the 1986 elections in Cali-
fornia, 139 incumbents ran for reelection
to legislative or executive posts. All 139
were reelected. Not a single challenger
prevailed. And the margins were not
close. Outside the visible challenge to
Senator Cranston, the closest any chal-
lenger came to an incumbent was eight
percentage points. The average margin
of victory was almost 3-1. That is not a
functioning democracy.
Incumbents have a natural advantage
from their incumbency. But political
scientists traditionally allocate no more
than a 10% vote premium to the visibili-
ty and favor-dispensation opportunities
of holding office. There is also out-
rageous gerrymandering in California.
Districts are not drawn around natural
communities, but are irresponsibly cre-
ated in ink-spill fashion to accommodate
political security.
But the most dangerous threat to a
system of possible democratic challenge
lies with campaign finance. In 1986,
incumbents outraised their challengers
by more than 30-1. And the trend grows
worse as campaign costs continue to
escalate at more than 30% per election.
On the average, it now costs more than
ten times the salary of a state senator or
assemblymember to finance that pos-
ition's election.
In 1987, state legislative candidates
raised over $25 million dollars, and 1987
was not even an election year! Of that
$25 million, a grand total of $400,000,
or under 2%, was raised by prospective
challengers to incumbents. The rest was
raised by incumbents. The amount of
money to be spent in 1988, nearly all by
incumbents, is projected at over $100
million.
Over 94% of this money comes from
contributions of over $100; 80% comes
in amounts over $2,000; 92% comes from
outside the candidates' district; and over
70% comes directly from special interest
"political action committees" in Sacra-
mento. California's associations of doc-
tors, lawyers, insurance firms, bankers,
etc., control the funding of our legis-
lators' campaigns. The legislators' result-
ing obligations give these interests an
absolute ability to stop any legislation
which might threaten their respective
narrow interests. The continuing par-
alysis in the area of insurance reform
is but one of many examples of the
consequences of special interests' access
to legislators due to enormous campaign
contributions.
Our system of democracy-if it can
still be called that-is in jeopardy.
Two proposals to change the rules are
before the people of California. What
they provide and what happens to them
may be one of the most important pol-
itical decisions we make as a society in
this decade.
The Center for Public Interest Law
has invited comments from the organiza-
tions sponsoring two competing cam-
paign finance reform initiatives which
will appear on the June 1988 ballot.
We present first a summary of the pro-
visions of both initiatives, and then-in
unedited form-those statements.
The Initiatives
The "Campaign Spending Limits
Act" (hereinafter "the Gerken Initiative"
or "Proposition 68') is based upon a
proposal formulated by the California
Commission on Campaign Financing in
its 1985 publication entitled The New
Gold Rush: Financing California's Legis-
lative Campaigns. The initiative's pri-
mary proponent is Walter B. Gerken,
chief executive officer of Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Company. A coalition of
groups, including California Common
Cause, the League of Women Voters of
California, the California Newspaper
Publishers Association, and Consumers
Union, support the Gerken Initiative.
The "Campaign Contribution Limits
Without Taxpayer Financing Initiative"
(hereinafter "the Johnson Initiative" or
"Proposition 73") is sponsored by Assem-
blymember Ross Johnson and Senators
Joseph Montoya and Quentin Kopp.
Supporters of the Johnson Initiative in-
clude the California Chamber of Com-
merce, the San Mateo County Taxpayers
Association, the Del Norte Taxpayers
League, the Marin United Taxpayers
Association, the Yolo County Board of
Supervisors, and the Nevada County
Board of Supervisors.
Primary Differences. While both in-
itiatives contain contribution limitations,
the Gerken Initiative establishes overall
campaign expenditure limitations and a
system of public financing for candidates
who agree to the limitations. The con-
cepts of voluntary campaign expenditure
limitations and public financing are con-
stitutionally linked, because the U.S.
Supreme Court has ruled that the im-
position of expenditure limits on a
candidate for political office is constitu-
tionally permissible only where the can-
didate voluntarily accepts some public
campaign financing. I
The Gerken Initiative applies only to
candidates for state legislative office; the
Johnson Initiative applies to candidates
for state legislative office, statewide
offices, and local government offices.
The Gerken Initiative prohibits what
has come to be known as "off-year fund-
raising;" that is, legislators, legislative
candidates, and their controlled commit-
tees are precluded from accepting contri-
butions in any year other than the year
in which the legislator/candidate is listed
on the ballot as a candidate. The John-
son Initiative does not prohibit off-year
fundraising.
Under the Gerken Initiative, candi-
dates who qualify for public matching
funds and who accept campaign expendi-
ture limitations are restricted in the
amount they are permitted to contribute
to their own campaigns. The Johnson
Initiative places no limits on the amount




Both initiatives set up a scheme of
limitations on contributions to candi-
dates from many types of contributors,
including individuals, organizations,
political action committees (PACs), pol-
itical parties, legislative caucuses, the
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candidate him/ herself, and other entities
described and defined in the initiatives.
As described below, the Gerken Initiative
sets contribution limits for specific types
of elections (e.g., primary elections
or general elections) or, alternatively,
for the "two-year period" which com-
prises a legislative session (defined as
the period commencing with January 1
of an odd-numbered year and ending
with December 31 of an even-numbered
year). The Johnson Initiative prescribes
contribution limitations per fiscal year
(defined as the period July I through
June 30).
Individuals. Under the Gerken Initia-
tive, an individual may contribute a
maximum of $1,000 to a legislative can-
didate and his/her controlled committee
during each primary and each general
election period (in other words, the Ger-
ken Initiative permits individuals to
contribute a maximum of $2,000 to a
legislative candidate-$ 1,000 for the
primary election, and an additional
$1,000 for the general election). 2
The Johnson Initiative limits an indi-
vidual's contribution to a candidate and
his/her controlled committee to $1,000
per fiscal year.
Organizations. Under the Gerken In-
itiative, "organizations" (defined in the
initiative to include labor unions, part-
nerships, corporations, or committees
which have 25 or more employees, share-
holders, contributors, or members) are
limited to contributing a maximum of
$2,500 to any legislative candidate per
election period (again, $2,500 for the
primary election and $2,500 for the gen-
eral election). 3
The Johnson Initiative defines the
term "person" to include organizations
such as partnerships, corporations, com-
mittees, and labor organizations, and
restricts their contributions to candi-
dates and their controlled committees to
$1,000 per fiscal year.
Political Action Committees. Under
the Gerken Initiative, some political
action committees may fall within the
definition of "organization" described
above, and would thus be subject to a
maximum $2,500-per-candidate-per-elec-
tion-period limit. However, the Gerken
Initiative also defines the term "small
contributor political action committee,"
and raises the maximum contribution
for such groups to $5,000 to any legis-
lative candidate per election. To qualify
for such status, a group must meet all
four of the following criteria: (1) all
contributions it receives from any person
in a twelve-month period total $50 or
less; (2) it has been in existence at least
six months; (3) it contributes to at least
five candidates; and (4) it is not a can-
didate-controlled committee.
The Johnson Initiative defines the
term "political committee" as "a com-
mittee of persons who receive contribu-
tions from two or more persons and
acting in concert makes contributions
to candidates." "Political commit-
tees," as defined, are limited to contri-
butions of $2,500 to any candidate in
any fiscal year.
The Johnson Initiative also defines
the term "broad based political commit-
tee" to mean a committee of persons
which has been in existence for more
than six months, receives contributions
from 100 or more persons, and acting in
concert makes contributions to five or
more candidates. Such a committee is
restricted to contributions of $5,000 to
any candidate in any fiscal year. I
Political Parties and Legislative
Caucuses. The Gerken Initiative limits
contributions from political parties and
legislative caucuses to $50,000 per
Assembly candidate per general or spe-
cial runoff election, and $75,000 per
Senate candidate per general or special
runoff election.
5
The Johnson Initiative limits political
parties to contributions of no more than
$5,000 to a candidate in any fiscal year.
With regard to contributions from legis-
lative caucuses, the Johnson Initiative
states that candidates may accept cam-
paign contributions only from "persons,
political committees, broad based politi-
cal committees, and political parties."
Thus, contributions to candidate from
legislative caucuses are prohibited under
the Johnson Initiative.
Other Contribution Limits
Individuals. Under the Gerken Initia-
tive, individuals are prohibited from
donating more than $1,000 per year to
any committee which supports or op-
poses any legislative candidate. Individ-
uals are also precluded from contrib-
uting more than $5,000 in a two-year
period to any political party or legisla-
tive caucus. Finally, the Gerken Initia-
tive limits an individual's aggregate
contribution to legislative candidates or
to committees supporting legislative can-
didate to $25,000 in a two-year period.
The Johnson Initiative prohibits indi-
viduals from contributing more than
$2,500 per fiscal year to any particular
political committee, broad based politic-
al committee, or political party; it con-
tains no aggregate contribution limit.
Organizations. Under the Gerken
Initiative, "organizations" (as defined
above) are prohibited from contributing
more than $2,500 per year to any com-
mittee which supports or opposes any
legislative candidate. Nor may "organi-
zations" donate more than $5,000 in a
two-year period to any political party or
legislative caucus. Finally, an "organiza-
tion's" aggregate contribution to legisla-
tive candidates must not exceed $200,000
in a two-year period.
The Johnson Initiative prohibits organ-
izations (other than political committees
and broad based political committees)
from contributing more than $2,500 per
fiscal year to any political committee,
broad based political committee, or pol-
itical party; it contains no aggregate con-
tribution limit.
Political Action Committees. Under
the Gerken Initiative, no "small contri-
butor political action committee," as
defined, may contribute more than
$5,000 in a two-year period to any com-
mittee supporting or opposing a legis-
lative candidate. "Small contributor
political action committees" are also pre-
cluded from donating more than $5,000
in a two-year period to a political party
or legislative caucus, and from making
contributions aggregating more than
$200,000 in a two-year period to legisla-
tive candidate or to committees support-
ing legislative candidates.
"Political committees," as defined by
the Johnson Initiative, are limited to a
maximum of $2,500 per candidate per
fiscal year; "broad based political com-
mittees," as defined, may contribute no
more than $5,000 per candidate per fiscal
year. The Johnson Initiative contains no
aggregate contribution limit for political
committees or broad based political
committees.
Candidate-To-Candidate Transfers
Both initiatives prohibit the transfer





Under the Gerken Initiative, legisla-
tors and legislative candidates are pro-
hibited from accepting more than $2,000
in honoraria and gifts in a two-year
period from any person other than a
member of the candidate family.
The Johnson Initiative prohibits
"elected officeholders" from accepting
any honorarium or gift from a single
source in excess of $1,000 in any calen-
dar year "for any speech, article, or
published work on a subject relating to
the governmental process."
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Mass Mailings
The Johnson Initiative defines "mass
mailing" to mean 200 or more substan-
tially similar pieces of mail, not includ-
ing "a form letter or other mail which is
sent in response to an unsolicited request,
letter, or other inquiry." The Johnson
Initiative would amend existing section
89001 of the Government Code to pro-
vide that "no newsletter or other mass
mailing shall be sent at public expense."
The Gerken Initiative retains current
law, which allows elected officials to
send mass mailings to voters at public
expense, but prohibits them after the
elected officer has declared candidacy
for office. Proposition 68 also requires
any person who makes an independent
expenditure for a mass mailing which
supports or opposes any candidate to
identify him/ herself on the envelope and
on each page or fold of the mailing.
Campaign Expenditure Limitations
Unlike the Johnson Initiative, the
Gerken Initiative establishes overall cam-
paign expenditure limitations, upon
which receipt of public financing is con-
ditioned (see discussion infra). Under
the Gerken Initiative, a legislative can-
didate must decide, upon filing a declar-
ation of candidacy, whether to accept or
reject limitations on the total amount
he/she will spend in the primary and
general elections. A candidate who ac-
cepts expenditure limitations is eligible
to receive public financing from the
Campaign Reform Fund created by the
Gerken Initiative.
The maximum expenditure limits for
Assembly candidates are $150,000 for
the primary election and $225,000 for
the general election, for a total of
$375,000. Senate candidates may spend
up to $250,000 for the primary election
and $350,000 for the general election,
for a total of $600,000.
These expenditure limitations are
lifted for elections in which a legislative
candidate who refused the expenditure
limits exceeds the limits, or if an inde-
pendent committee or committees spend
more than $50,000 in support of or in
opposition to any candidate in that
election. When the expenditure limits
are lifted, candidates who originally
accepted the limits remain eligible for
public financing, and are also permitted
to receive an additional $35,000 free of
contribution limitations.
Public Campaign Financing
The Johnson Initiative prohibits
public officers from spending and candi-
dates for office from accepting "public
moneys for the purpose of seeking
office."'
The Gerken Initiative creates a Cam-
paign Reform Fund, which would be
financed through a voluntary $3 income
tax form check-off designation. That is,
"[e]very individual whose income tax
liability for any taxable year is three
dollars ($3) or more may designate an
amount up to three dollars ($3) of that
tax liability to be deposited into the
Campaign Reform Fund."8 The Fund
would become the source of public
financing for qualified legislative can-
didates.
In order to qualify for public financ-
ing from the Campaign Reform Fund,
legislative candidates must agree to the
applicable overall expenditure limita-
tions set forth above, and must raise a
threshold amount of $1,000-or-less con-
tributions. Assembly candidates must
raise $20,000 in contributions of $1,000
or less; Senate candidates must raise
$30,000 in contributions of $1,000 or
less. The candidate must also agree to
contribute no more than $50,000 per
election of his/her personal funds to the
legislative campaign.
Even if a legislative candidate raises
the threshold amount and agrees to the
personal contribution limitation, he/she
may not receive public financing unless
his/her opponent has also qualified for
public financing, or has raised, spent, or
has cash on hand of at least $35,000.
Candidates who qualify for public
financing would receive funds from the
Campaign Reform Fund based on a
matching formula. Contributions of
$250 or less from a single source outside
the candidate's district would be matched
with public funds on a three-to-one
basis. Contributions of $250 or less
from a single source within in the candi-
date's district would be matched on a
five-to-one basis. Contributions from
candidates or members of their immedi-
ate families may not be matched with
public funds.
Under the Gerken Initiative, qualified
legislative candidates are restricted to
receiving one-half of their overall cam-
paign expenditure limitation in public
matching funds. In other words, an
Assembly candidate could receive a
maximum of $75,000 in matching funds
for a primary election and $112,500 in
matching funds for a general election.
Senate candidates would be limited to a
maximum of $125,000 in matching funds
for a primary election and $175,000 in
matching funds for a general election.
Legislative candidates who have re-
ceived matching public funds and who
have a surplus of campaign funds after
the general election must return a por-
tion of that surplus to the Campaign
Reform Fund, based on a ratio of the
public funds received by the candidate
compared to the private funds raised by
the candidate for each election. If more
than $100,000 remains after return of
the prorated surplus to the Campaign
Reform Fund, the candidate must either
return all funds over $100,000 to his/her
contributors on a pro rata basis, or
donate the surplus over $100,000 to the
Campaign Reform Fund. With respect
to a surplus in the Campaign Reform
Fund, all money over $1 million remain-
ing in the Campaign Reform Fund as of
January 31 in the year following a gen-
eral election must be refunded to the
General Fund.
THE ARGUMENTS
The Campaign Spending Limits Act
(Proposition 68)
by Walter Zelman, Executive Director
California Common Cause
Campaign spending by candidates
for the California state legislature has
escalated 4,000% since 1958. Between
1984 and 1986 (the last two legislative
elections), it rose 30%. In 1986, candi-
dates for the state legislature spent over
$57 million-$10.47 per vote. Without
controls on spending, legislative candi-
dates are expected to spend $100 million
during the 1990 races. That's $100
million spent to fill 100 legislative seats.
Where does all this money come
from? Increasingly, it comes from organ-
ized special interests, not from individ-
ual voters, and particularly, not from
voters in the candidate's own district! In
the recent elections, legislative candidates
received, on average, only 13% of their
money from individuals in amounts of
$100 or more; only 6% in contributions
under $100 each; and 92% from outside
their home districts!
Clearly, the average voter and small
contributor has little or no meaningful
role in financing today's campaigns.
Is it possible for someone not an
incumbent to be elected to the state
legislature? The facts speak for them-
selves. In 1976, Assembly incumbents
outspent their challengers 3-1 on average.
Ten years later, Assembly incumbents
outspent their challengers 30-1, and Sen-
ate incumbents did so by the incredible
ratio of 62-1! Tn 1985, one of the most
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recent nonelection years, before it was
even known who the candidates would
be in the 1986 election, incumbents added
$17 million to their war chests in contri-
butions, compared to $42,000 for chal-
lengers-a 400-1 advantage.
The result: in 1986, not one incum-
bent lost in either the primary or the
general election. And more recently, dur-
ing the 1987 nonelection year, incumbent
legislators raised over $25 million-a
48% jump over what they raised in 1985.
Thorough Bipartisan Study
of the Problem
These alarming facts come from a
careful study of the campaign spending
problem in our state legislature conduct-
ed in 1984-85 (and supplemented in 1987)
by a representative, private, nonpartisan,
foundation-financed group of California
citizens, none of whom represented any
organization and none of whom had
any axe to grind.
The product of the study was a report
entitled The New Gold Rush: Financing
California's Legislative Campaigns. The
study found that by far the most serious
problems existed in the state legislature.
It concluded that "California is witness-
ing a new political gold rush. Candi-
dates.. .are throwing themselves with
increasing abandon into a fundraising
arms race in which each tries to outraise
and outspend all opponents. [This] fund-
raising fever is distorting many aspects
of California's political process."
Others have put it more bluntly. To
quote state Senator Ed Davis, "We have
widespread corruption. We have had...
the purchasing of votes.. .with campaign
contributions...."
The study also found that California
was out of step with the rest of the
county in controlling campaign contri-
butions and spending. Fourteen years
ago, California adopted an excellent
campaign disclosure law. But that is all
we have. A majority of the fifty states
have leapfrogged us, enacting laws regu-
lating the size of contributions and/or
the amount of spending. We are behind
the times and the facts prove it.
What's To Be Done?
The study gave birth to the Cam-
paign Spending Limits Act Initiative.
The study unanimously recommended a
new law which would deal in a compre-
hensive fashion with these very serious
problems.
The primary feature is spending limits.
Under decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court, spending limits must be volun-
tarily accepted: they cannot be imposed-
but candidates can agree to them in
exchange for limited public matching
funds. This is the basis for the spending
limits now in effect in eight states and
for federal presidential elections.
The proposed new law also includes
contribution limits. It prohibits off-year
campaign contributions (the incumbent's
greatest advantage) and transfers of con-
tributions from one candidate to another.
It includes carefully-drafted provisions
to limit the advantages possessed by
wealthy candidates.
The study concluded that although
simpler solutions-such as contribution
limits alone-may appear more attractive,
they will not solve the problem: witness
the $22 million Cranston-Zschau U.S.
Senate race, which was run under contri-
bution limits but without spending limits.
The Campaign Spending Limits Act
Initiative, now Proposition 68 on the
June ballot, is based on and includes
each of the study's fundamental recom-
mendations: first, the spending limits
recommended by the study; second, con-
tribution limits; third, a ban on off-year
fundraising and transfers; and fourth,
provisions to limit the advantages of
wealthy candidates. Finally, to make the
spending limits constitutionally effective,
it includes limited public matching funds
in a form which will encourage the sol-
icitation of small givers, reduce reliance
of candidates on large contributions
from special interests, and ease the
fundraising crunch for serious, viable
candidates.
Why Limited Public Matching Funds?
The answer is simple: no spending
limits are possible without public fi-
nancing. And spending limits are vital.
As a matter of fact, if you ban public
financing (as other initiatives do), you
prevent voters or any government body
from enacting spending limits.
When the study began, its members
were highly doubtful about any use of
public moneys. At the end, the need for
spending limits was felt to be so para-
mount that all members of the study agreed
a matching funds program was vital.
Here's how it would work: Each state
income taxpayer would have the oppor-
tunity each year to voluntarily check off
a box on their state tax form. The tax
check-off essentially earmarks a maxi-
mum of $3 of the tax already owed for
the "Campaign Reform Fund." This is
the way it has been done for thirteen
years in presidential elections on the
federal tax forms-each taxpayer can
choose whether or not to participate.
This choice would not increase the tax-
payer's tax liability.
The public financing system has been
designed to encourage candidates to seek
more contributions from small contribu-
tors, particularly from the candidate's
own district. Qualified candidates can
receive up to 50% of the maximum spend-
ing limit from the matching public funds.
Only contributions of $250 or less are
matched; for every $1 a candidate raises
from a registered voter in their district,
they receive $5 in matching funds; and
for every $1 the candidate raises from
an organization, PAC, or individual who
is not a registered voter in their district,
they can receive $3.
Only a serious candidate who has a
serious opponent can receive any match-
ing funds. First, a candidate must be
opposed by another candidate who has
raised or spent $35,000. Second, a candi-
date wishing to receive matching public
funds must raise a large portion of their
first $35,000 from contributions of $1000
or less ($20,000 of the first $35,000 if
they are an Assembly candidate and
$30,000 if a Senate candidate).
At the end of each general election,
each candidate must return unspent pub-
lic matching funds (on a ratio basis) to
the state. All candidates taking public
financing are audited each election,
rather than the current 25% random
audit the Fair Political Practices Com-
mission carries out now. All money in
excess of $1 million held by the Cam-
paign Reform Fund must be returned at
that time to the State Treasury.
What Will It Cost?
The public financing part of the in-
itiative is carefully limited to hold down
the cost. Only money voluntarily checked-
off by the taxpayers can be used. Esti-
mates based on the last four elections
show the cost of this matching funds
program would average $5.9 million per
year, or 22 cents per Californian-the
cost of one postage stamp per year!
Who Supports the Initiative?
A broad, bipartisan coalition of
persons and organizations have lent their
support:
Business and Labor: business groups
such as the California Business Round-
table, and over 27 individual chief execu-
tive and senior officers of Califor-
nia-based corporations; and labor
organizations such as the California
Conference of Machinists-AFL-CIO,
Laborers International Union of North
America-AFL-CIO, the California
Federation of Teachers-AFL-CIO, the
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California Nurses Association, and the
International Longshoreman's and
Warehouseman's Union Legislative Coun-
cil, among others.
Public Interest Groups: California
Common Cause, League of Women
Voters of California, Faculty Associa-
tion of California Community Colleges;
California Public Interest Research
Group; American Association of Univer-
sity Women; Sierra Club; Planning and
Conservation League; Urban League
(Sacramento and Los Angeles); Califor-
nia Church Council; Congress of Cali-
fornia Seniors; Consumers Union; and
many others.
News Media: Proposition 68 was
recently endorsed unanimously by the
Board of Directors of the California
Newspaper Publishers Association. The
recommendations of the study on which
the Initiative is based are supported by
most of California's major newspapers,
including the Los Angeles Times, the
San Francisco Chronicle, the Los
Angeles Herald-Examiner, the Long
Beach Press Telegram, the San Diego
Union, the San Bernardino Sun, the
Sacramento Bee, the San Diego Tribune,
and the San Jose Mercury News.
Opposition to the Initiative
Some incumbent legislators and big
spending lobbying groups are supporting
another initiative. The Johnson Initia-
tive, Proposition 73 on the June ballot,
is called "campaign finance reform," but
it is so weak and so riddled with loop-
holes that it will only worsen the present
situation. It will solve nothing. It was
put on the ballot almost entirely by five
of the largest, moneyed PACs in the
state. Proposition 73 contains poorly
designed contribution limits that would
allow any moneyed PAC to get in over
$2 million during each election; does
nothing about nonelection-year fundrais-
ing; has no spending limits; does not
have aggregate contribution limits con-
trolling how much contributors can give
or how much candidates can receive
from organizations and PACs; applies
the same limits to all state and local
elections-imposing the same limits on
the Governor's election as on a local
school board election; limits gifts and
honoraria only for speeches "relating to
the government process"; and bans all
publicly financed newsletters and mass
mailings in such a sloppy fashion as to
likely limit the ability of various govern-
ment departments from sending out in-
formation to California's citizens.
The startling increases in campaign
spending in California legislative races
are threatening the health of democracy
in California. Only the Campaign Spend-
ing Limits Act, Proposition 68, attacks
this problem comprehensively and effect-
ively.
Why An Initiative and Not A Bill
in the Legislature?
The best answer was given by Fred
Kline in the Sacramento Daily Reporter:
"Money is influencing and corrupt-
ing the political process here, and
yet the people who should be the
most concerned-the politicians-
seem least inclined to do some-
thing about it. They act like
alcoholics who know they have a
problem but can't be helped until
they really want to seek it. The
politicians are drunk with money,
staggering under the weight and
impact of it, yet are unable to
break the addiction."
Your Support is Vital
Only with the support of millions of
concerned Californians can the initiative
succeed this coming June. Please help!
Contributions should be sent to Tax-
payers To Limit Campaign Spending,
10951 West Pico, 1st Floor, Los Angeles,
CA 90064. For more information, call
(213) 470-2444, (916) 443-1792, or (415)
441-3060.
The Best Way To Achieve
Campaign Finance Reform-
Proposition 73
by Assemblyman Ross Johnson
There is almost universal agreement
that we must make changes in the way
political campaigns are financed. How-
ever, there is strong disagreement as to
how this should be accomplished.
Proposition 73, which has been put
forward by Senators Quentin Kopp (I-
San Francisco/San Mateo Counties),
Joseph Montoya (D-Los Angeles Coun-
ty), and myself (R-Orange County),
seeks to place limits on contributions
as a way to achieve campaign finance
reform. Proposition 68, on the other
hand, seeks to enact public financing of
campaigns as a means for reform.
There is documented evidence that
limits on contributions do work as a
means of reducing campaign expendi-
tures.
Look at 1982: compare the guber-
natorial race (Bradley vs. Deukmejian)
with the U.S. Senate race (Wilson vs.
Brown). The two candidates for Gover-
nor spent nearly twice as much money
as the two candidates in the Senate race
(Bradley/ Deukmejian spent $19,321,442,
while Wilson/Brown spent $11,909,303.)
No one would seriously contend that
either Wilson or Brown didn't spend
enough to get their message out to the
voters. And no one in their right mind
would contend that the Deukmejian/
Bradley race was twice as informative or
helpful to the voters of California. The
main difference was that the Senate race
was conducted under federal contribu-
tion limits.
The 1986 election proves this point
even more. According to the Fair Pol-
itical Practices Commission, Bradley/
Deukmejian spent $22,448,162 while
Cranston/Zschau cost $20,691,040. This
is in spite of the fact that the Cranston/
Zschau race was one of the most hotly-
contested United States Senate races in
the country, while Bradley/ Deukmejian
was regarded as a ho-hum affair with
the outcome a foregone conclusion
almost from the beginning.
You don't have to have expenditure
limits and the tax-funded financing that
goes with them to reduce the political
arms race. Compare congressional races
in California with legislative races. We
have not seen the dramatic increases in
the cost of California congressional races
that we have in legislative races. In fact,
between 1982 and 1984, the cost of Cal-
ifornia congressional campaigns actually
decreased by about $9 million, while in
the same time period legislative races
increased by more than $10 million.
Obviously, it is impossible to discuss
Proposition 73 without addressing Prop-
osition 68 since both measures appear
on the June ballot.
The proponents of Proposition 68
claim that true reform is only possible
with public financing of campaigns, and
have questioned the motives of Senators
Kopp and Montoya and myself in putting
Proposition 73 forward. All three of us
have been very active in the area of
campaign finance reform for a number
of years. Senator Kopp was the author
of an ordinance as a county supervisor
in San Francisco to limit campaign con-
tributions; Senator Montoya has author-
ed numerous bills in the legislature
in this subject area; and I authored
Proposition 40 in 1984 which sought to
drastically limit campaign contributions.
At the outset, it is important to point
out that Proposition 68 was placed on
the ballot with $500,000 in contributions
from California's largest corporations
and other special interests, including
insurance companies, banks, major devel-
opers, and other huge corporations that
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contribute hundreds of thousands of dol-
lars to political campaigns.
These special interests did not contri-
bute such large sums of money out of a
sense of public-spirited benevolence.
They did so because of their ability to
multiply their contributions to cam-
paigns with our tax money. Proposition
68 allows donations from corporations,
labor unions and other special interests
to be matched at a 3-1 ratio with public
funds. In other words, businesses can
have their $250 contributions turned into
$1,000. This is welfare for large special
interest contributors.
Another problem with the public
financing provisions in Proposition 68 is
that there is nothing to prevent tax
dollars from going to extremist candi-
dates, such as Ku Klux Klan or
LaRouche candidates.
To understand an illustration of how
this could work, you need to know sev-
eral definitions from Proposition 68.
First, a contribution is a check that you
deposit in your campaign account and
keep for at least fourteen days. Second,
contributions of husbands and wives are
presumed to be separate. Contributions
of children over eighteen years of age
are also presumed to be separate. In
order to qualify for tax money, a candi-
date in an Assembly primary must raise
a total of $20,000. And finally, contri-
butions up to $250 from registered voters
within the district are matched on a 5-1
basis with tax money.
If Proposition 68 were to pass, the
leader of a small group of Neo-Nazis in
one Assembly district could gather his
thirty members and lay out a scheme
like this:
"I am going to run for the State
Assembly."
"I want each of you to write a $250
check."
"I want each of you to tell your wife
or husband and any children over the
age of eighteen to do the same."
"We need a total of sixty $250 checks.
Don't worry, we won't actually spend
your money-just hold it for fourteen
days."
"Five of us will write checks for
$1,000."
See how it works? They raised
$20,000-$15,000 of it matched on a 5-
1 basis. They would instantly collect
$75,000 of your tax money.
Then the leader says, "I want each of
you to distribute some brochures. I'm
going to pay each of you $250 to do
that, except for those who wrote a check
for $1,000, and I'l pay you $1,000."
The net result is that Proposition 68
would have given them $75,000 to spread
their propaganda and they wouldn't have
actually raised a red cent.
And there is absolutely no way to
correct this defect-either now or in the
future. Moreover, this could apply to an
extremist or a member of the Young
Democrats or Young Republicans seek-
ing to build name identification for a
future political career.
In contrast, under Proposition 73
such abuse is not even theoretically pos-
sible since the use of tax money in cam-
paigns is not allowed.
Now to some of the other defects in
Proposition 68 and a comparison with
Proposition 73. In its 1985 report, The
New Gold Rush, the California Commis-
sion on Campaign Financing described
the transfer of funds from one legislator's
campaign committee to another candi-
date's committee as the "fastest growing
source of campaign money in Califor-
nia." And yet, Proposition 68 fails to
effectively eliminate transfers as a source
of campaign contributions.
First of all, Proposition 68 specifical-
ly allows legislative caucus committees
(as well as political parties) to contribute
$50,000 to Assembly candidates and
$75,000 to Senate candidates. An even
more important failure of the transfer-
ban language contained in Proposition
68 is that the proposal allows unlimited
transfers of money from legislative can-
didates or officeholders to committees
set up to oppose candidates.
To understand this point completely,
it is important to point out that Propo-
sition 68 only applies to legislative races
and does not affect candidates for state-
wide or local offices, thus giving a loop-
hole to legislative candidates and office-
holders to circumvent the contribution
limitations.
Proposition 68 allows legislative office-
holders to set up local and/or statewide
campaign accounts simultaneously with
their own legislative campaign accounts.
The local/statewide campaign would re-
ceive contributions in any amounts.
There is nothing in Proposition 68 to
prevent legislative officeholders from
transferring funds in these accounts into
committees set up to oppose legislative
candidates. Again, it is important to
note that there would be no limits what-
soever on how much money could be
transferred. With absolutely no restric-
tions on funds going into committees
opposing candidates, we can expect an
enormous increase in negative campaigns.
Proposition 73, on the other hand,
contains an inter-candidate transfer ban
that is absolute. It also prohibits contri-
butions from legislative caucuses and
only allows a $5,000 contribution per
fiscal year from political parties. Since
the initiative covers all state and local
races, it would be impossible for candi-
dates and officeholders to find a way to
circumvent the transfer prohibition.
Another key point about Proposition
73 is that the proposal also stops the so-
called "shopping for office." It specifies
that a candidate must raise funds for the
office he has declared and cannot trans-
fer those funds to his campaign for an-
other office. For example, a state
Senator cannot suddenly decide to run
for a statewide office, such as Lieutenant
Governor, and then use those funds
raised for his state Senate race to run
for Lieutenant Governor.
Another defect in Proposition 68 is
the protection it gives to incumbents.
Sponsors and supporters of Proposition
68 have indicated a desire to reduce
many of the advantages that incumbents
currently enjoy over challengers, and
thus encourage more competitive races.
In reality, Proposition 68 does just the
opposite and actually increases the ad-
vantages of incumbents over challengers.
Proposition 68 specifically allows a
candidate to retain up to $100,000 sur-
plus from the previous election. Thus,
on January 1 of an even-numbered year,
an incumbent could start with $100,000
and a challenger would be starting with
zero, unless that challenger had run in
the previous election and also had a
surplus.
This $100,000 carryover takes on even
greater importance because of the way
the off-year contribution ban is written
in Proposition 68. Two points must first
be made about the off-year contribution
ban. First, it is constitutionally suspect
given the United States Supreme Court
decisions in this area. Second, propo-
nents of Proposition 68 claim that the
prohibition on off-year contributions
will benefit challengers because incum-
bents have a fundraising advantage in
non-election years. If the sponsors were
so concerned about this, then why is the
off-year ban only on raising money, not
on making expenditures?
Thus, incumbents would be able to
spend money in the off-year, building
up their name identification, maintaining
a campaign office, and doing the prepara-
tory work for raising large sums of
money as of January 1 of the even-
numbered year. Challengers, on the
other hand, unless they have run before
and have a surplus, would not be able
to open a campaign office before January
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1 of the even-numbered year. In addi-
tion, challengers would not be able to
even consult with an accountant or an
attorney about setting up their commit-
tees because that would be treated as an
in-kind contribution. The initiative says
that candidates cannot accept any contri-
butions. It does not specify monetary
contributions.
In contrast, Proposition 73 seeks to
eliminate a key advantage currently avail-
able to most incumbents-mass mailings
at public expense. Officeholders at all
levels of government can use these tax-
paid mailings to build up their name
identification and make themselves look
good to their constituents. And these
are usually sent in the off-year when
challengers, under Proposition 68, would
be unable to send out similar mailings.
In addition, Proposition 73 seeks to
deal with the off-year fundraising ques-
tion in a constitutional way. Contribu-
tions are based on fiscal years from July
I to June 30. A candidate who wants to
run for election in 1988 would face the
following scenario. That candidate would
have been able to raise ten $1,000 contri-
butions from individuals in September
1987. Those same individuals would be
unable to contribute any more money
toward that candidate's primary race and
would not be able to contribute again
until July 1, 1988. If those ten individ-
uals then contributed to the candidate's
general election in November 1988, they
would be unable to give any more money
to that same candidate until after July
1, 1989. Thus, candidates, whether in-
cumbents or challengers, who wanted to
use the off-year for fundraising would
not receive any unfair advantage since
they would be limited to collecting any
new money from those same contribu-
tors until well after the primary election.
The proponents of Proposition 68
like to point out that their proposal
would definitely limit spending. That
simply is untrue. In its decision in
Buckley v. Valeo, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that you cannot
impose spending limits without providing
public financing of campaigns. At the
same time, however, the Court also ruled
that you cannot force candidates to
accept public financing for their cam-
paigns. Thus, the whole system of spend-
ing limits contained in Proposition 68 is
based on voluntary compliance.
Most legislative races would not ap-
proach the spending limit levels set in
Proposition 68. However, in very hotly-
contested races that Proposition 68 seeks
to affect, you would see candidates
choose not to take any public funds so
they would not have to adhere to any
spending limits.
In contrast, Proposition 73 is manda-
tory and applies to all officeholders
across the board. While it does not con-
tain any direct expenditure limits, spend-
ing will be reduced because of the con-
tribution limits making less money
available to candidates. And these con-
tribution limits are lower than the limits
contained in Proposition 68.
And to re-emphasize another point,
the mandatory limits contained in Propo-
sition 73 apply to all local, legislative,
and statewide candidates. Proposition
68 only applies to legislative candidates
and does not deal with the escalating
costs of running for Governor or other
statewide or local races.
A last point to bring out about Propo-
sition 68 is the cost. The proponents
claim it would cost taxpayers around
$12 or $15 million every two years. It is
impossible to predict the costs. But one
thing is for sure. With the availability of
public funds, more candidates would be
encouraged to run. They would have
greater credibility in raising funds if they
are able to tell a potential supporter
that a $250 contribution from an individ-
ual is really a $1,500 contribution be-
cause it is matched on a 5-1 ratio. It is
not inconceivable to see more contested
primaries and at least three candidates
in a general election, which would in-
clude a third party candidate. Given
that assumption, the price tag would
rise to $70 million every two years for
legislative races alone. That is money
coming directly out of the state General
Fund-money that would otherwise be
used for police protection, fire protec-
tion, schools, and other needed services.
Thus, there may not be a contested pri-
mary in every legislative district, but
there would be multi-candidate contests
with as many as four, five, or even six
candidates in other races.
This year voters are faced with a
clear choice between two proposals to
reform the way political campaigns are
financed. One applies to legislative races
only and imposes an all-out system of
public financing-Proposition 68. The
other applies to all campaigns, from the
Governor on down to the local library




1. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96
S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976).
2. Under the Gerken Initiative, this
limitation on contributions to candidates
from individuals does not apply until
the candidate has raised $35,000 in the
election year.
3. Like the limitation on contribu-
tions to candidates from individuals, the
Gerken Initiative limitation on contri-
butions from organizations does not
apply until the candidate has raised
$35,000 in the election year.
4. The Johnson Initiative specifies
that "[n]othing in this Chapter shall limit
a person's ability to provide financial or
other support to one or more political
committees or broad based political
committees provided the support is used
for purposes other than making contri-
butions directly to candidates for elective
office."
5. The Gerken Initiative prohibits
contributions from a political party or
legislative caucus to a legislative candi-
date running in a primary election or
special election.
6. Again, the Gerken Initiative ap-
plies only to candidates for legislative
office; thus, it only prohibits transfers
from one legislative candidate to another
legislative candidate. The exact language
of the Gerken Initiative regarding trans-
fers is as follows: "No candidate and no
committee controlled by a candidate or
candidates for legislative office or con-
trolled by a legislator or legislators,
other than a legislative caucus or politi-
cal party, shall make any contribution
to a candidate running for legislative
office or to any committee supporting
such a candidate including a legislative
caucus committee or party committee."
The Johnson Initiative provides as
follows: "No candidate for elective office
or committee controlled by that candi-
date or candidates for elective office
shall transfer any contribution to any
other candidate for elective office. Trans-
fers of funds between candidates or their
controlled committees are prohibited."
7. In so doing, the Johnson Initiative
also prohibits the imposition of any
overall campaign expenditure limitations.
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that
campaign expenditure limitations are
permissible only as a condition for a
benefit which the candidate accepts, such
as public financing. Buckley v. Valeo,
supra note 1.
8. Taxpayers filing a joint return may
designate a maximum of $6 ($3 each) to
the Campaign Reform Fund. The Gerken
Initiative further provides that "tax-
payer designations of funds shall not
increase that taxpayer's tax liability."
-E
The California Regulatory Law Reporter Vol 8, No. 2 (Spring 1988)
